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COMBATING HINDSIGHT RECONSTRUCTION IN PATENT
PROSECUTION
ABSTRACT
The common saying “hindsight is 20–20” rings true in many different
areas; in patent law specifically, hindsight bias has the potential to affect a
patent examiner’s determination of whether an invention is “obvious” under
35 U.S.C. § 103. The examiner may permissibly rely upon a combination of
prior art references to find that a claim would have been obvious to a person
having ordinary skill in the art. However, the examiner may not use “that
which only the inventor taught . . . against its teacher.” Structural flaws within
the examination process place pressure upon examiners to reject claims upon
first examination, regardless of the content of those claims. The Supreme
Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. rejected the patent
applicant’s primary guard against hindsight bias: the Federal Circuit’s
teaching-suggestion-motivation test as the sole test for obviousness. This has
left the patent applicant with little to combat obviousness rejections based on
hindsight bias but the “secondary considerations” of Graham v. John Deere
Co. of Kansas City, which are rarely available at the prosecution stage.
This Comment proposes a framework that focuses on the question of
whether an examiner has impermissibly relied upon hindsight to combine
references in determining obviousness. This framework provides an avenue for
discussion between the patent examiner and the prosecuting attorney and
provides substance to be considered by decisionmakers on appeal. The intent
of the framework is to consider whether the examiner conducted the process of
the examination in a fair and reasonable manner with full appreciation of what
a person having ordinary skill in the art would have concluded when faced
with the prior art. The proposed framework puts forward ten factors which
should be considered in the totality of the circumstances, similar to the Wands
factors for enablement or the DuPont factors for likelihood of confusion in
Trademark Law.
These ten factors are not intended as an all-inclusive list but as examples of
inquiries that may bear on the question of hindsight, of which there are likely
many more. The adoption of this framework may increase the burden on
examiners as well as their supervisors, but this Comment argues that the
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benefit of adopting this framework, providing recourse to patent applicants
who may be unfairly deprived of patent claims they deserve, outweighs the
cost. The rejection of nonobvious patent applications thwarts one of the
primary purposes of patent law: incentivizing innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies have shown that, once aware of an invention, jurors are
much more likely to find that the invention would have been obvious.1 This
Comment explores the effect of that type of hindsight bias not on jurors during
a trial but instead on obviousness determinations during patent examination.
To obtain a patent, the rule has long been established that the claimed subject
matter must be nonobvious. The 1952 Patent Act required that the patent
examiner determine whether the invention in the patent application would have
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) at the
time of invention.2 If so, the invention did not meet the requirements for
patentability.3 After the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act went into force in
2013, the timing has changed: the standard is now whether the invention would
have been obvious to a PHOSITA at the time of filing.4 For the purposes of
this Comment, though, the underlying theme is the same: according to the text
of the statute, the examiner must view the claimed invention from a point in
time prior to its examination when determining obviousness.
Viewing the claimed invention at the time of filing the patent application—
or at the time of invention—is problematic since “[h]umans are cognitively
incapable of ignoring what they have learned . . . as required for the proper ex
ante analysis.”5 This phenomenon is commonly called the “hindsight bias.”6 In
the context of patent prosecution, “[o]nce the [examiner] knows that the
invention exists today, it can be difficult to prevent hindsight bias from
affecting the [examiner’s] analysis” of the nonobviousness requirement.7
Reliance upon hindsight creates a bias against patentability because the

1 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006).
2 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains.”).
3 See id.
4 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(c), 125 Stat. 284, 287 (2011) (“A patent
for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior
art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of
the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”).
5 Mandel, supra note 1, at 1400.
6 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 Natalie A. Thomas, Note, Secondary Considerations in Nonobviousness Analysis: The Use of
Objective Indicia Following KSR v. Teleflex, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2076 n.29 (2011).
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examiner views the invention as it exists and therefore merely as a trivial
advance in the start of the art.
Courts and legal scholars have struggled to formulate a test for
nonobviousness that compensates for the possibility that an examiner has
impermissibly “take[n] into account the ex post fact that the invention was
actually achieved”8 to reject patent claims as obvious. Current patent
applicants who suspect the presence of hindsight bias in their rejections for
obviousness have few avenues through which to address their concerns beyond
arguing technical distinctions. For that reason, this Comment proposes a
framework for determining whether an examiner has impermissibly relied
upon hindsight in her rejection. The framework includes a number of factors
that can weigh in favor of (or against) hindsight while considering whether the
examination process was conducted in a fair and reasonable manner, with full
appreciation of what a PHOSITA would have concluded when faced with the
cited prior art.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the history of
nonobviousness and the standards that courts have developed to combat
reliance upon impermissible hindsight. Part II examines the process of patent
examination and the difficulties encountered in patent prosecution after the
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. It also
explains why objective indicia of nonobviousness are an impractical solution
to the hindsight problem in the context of patent prosecution. Part III proposes
the framework for determining whether an examiner has employed
impermissible hindsight to reject claims as obvious under Section 103 by
considering a number of factors, most of which are directed toward the process
of examination. Finally, Part IV analyzes the potential impact on patent
prosecution and appeals if the proposed test were adopted.
I. THE REQUIREMENT OF NONOBVIOUSNESS
Since 1793, the requirements for patentability of an invention have
included novelty and utility.9 As the patent system developed, however, the
judiciary began to acknowledge a need for an additional element.10 This
judge-made element would further the goal of incentivizing innovation by
8

Mandel, supra note 1, at 1393.
See Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318.
10 See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850) (“[T]he improvement is the
work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.”).
9
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protecting only substantial advances in the state of the art rather than natural
technological evolution. In early cases such as Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, courts
required “that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements
of every invention” for an advance to be patentable.11 The standard of what
constituted an “invention” was never clear,12 which prompted lawmakers to
take notice. Section A of this Part describes the passage as well as early
interpretation of the Patent Act of 1952 in the seminal case of Graham v. John
Deere Co. of Kansas City and its successor cases. Next, section B chronicles
the Federal Circuit’s development of the teaching-suggestion-motivation
(TSM) test for obviousness and describes the ways in which that test was a
helpful guard against the hindsight bias. Finally, section C explains the
Supreme Court’s rejection of the TSM test as the sole test for obviousness in
KSR and its insistence on a more flexible standard.
A. Passage and Initial Interpretation of the Patent Act of 1952
Congress first codified the nonobviousness requirement for patentability in
Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 (1952 Act). The drafters of the 1952 Act
aimed to avoid the use of the word “invention” as a term of art indicating a
separate requirement for patentability; instead, the statute requires that an
invention be nonobvious.13 Today,14 Section 103 states as follows:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained,
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed
as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a
whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the

11

Id.
See Atlas Scraper & Eng’g Co. v. Pursche, 300 F.2d 467, 472 (9th Cir. 1961) (“It is a trite saying that
invention defies definition. Yet, through long use, the word has acquired certain characteristics which at least
give direction to its meaning. Invention is a concept; a thing evolved from the mind. It is not a revelation of
something which exists and was unknown, but is the creation of something which did not exist before,
possessing the elements of novelty and utility in kind and measure different from and greater than what the art
might expect from its skilled workers.” (quoting Pyrene Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 292 F. 480, 481 (3d Cir. 1923))
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So Obvious After All:
Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. REV. 41, 57
(2012) (“[T]he courts . . . struggled to define whether an advance was sufficient in any case to constitute an
invention . . . .”); Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 855, 860 (1964) (noting the “proliferation of views on what did and did not amount
to invention went on for 100 years” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13 See Rich, supra note 12, at 865.
14 As noted in the Introduction, the significant difference in the current statute and the Patent Act of 1952
is the point in time at which obviousness is considered. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.
12
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claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by
the manner in which the invention was made.15

In drafting Section 103, “Congress apparently intended to restate the basic
Hotchkiss test with the emphasis on obviousness.”16 However, the term
“obviousness” has proven as difficult to define as its predecessor “invention.”
Congress attempted to define obviousness as that which would have been
obvious to a PHOSITA but provided little guidance on how the standard
should be applied.
The Supreme Court first explored the constitutional boundaries for
determining patentability based on obviousness in the seminal case of Graham
v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City.17 The Court began its analysis by noting that
the starting point for federal patent power must be the Constitution,18 which
authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
Discoveries.”19 Regardless of the congressional intent of the 1952 Act,
Congress could not overstep the boundaries set by the Constitution.20 Within
those boundaries, though, Congress may “select[] the policy which in its
judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim.”21 The 1952 Act did just that
by adding for the first time an express requirement of nonobviousness for
patentability.22 The Court concluded that the “general level of patentable
invention” was not affected by Section 103 of the 1952 Act, which was
intended to codify earlier judicial precedents.23
The Court also articulated a four-factor test for determining
nonobviousness in Graham. First, a factfinder must determine “the scope and
content of the prior art.”24 This step is necessary before advancing to the next
step of ascertaining the “differences between the prior art and the claims at
15

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
Charles R. Haworth, Note, Patentability—Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 Construed, 44 TEX. L.
REV. 1405, 1407 (1966); see Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1966). However, there
is also evidence in the legislative history that Section 103 may have been a revision of the Hotchkiss standard.
See, e.g., Rich, supra note 12.
17 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
18 See id. at 5.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
20 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6.
21 Id. at 6.
22 See id. at 15.
23 See id. at 16–17.
24 Id. at 17.
16
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issue.”25 In other words, the decisionmaker must determine what the prior art is
and whether it is different than the newly claimed invention. Third, the
factfinder must determine “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.”26
This third consideration is important because the terms of the statute require
that obviousness be judged from the point of view of a PHOSITA.27 Finally,
the factfinder may utilize “secondary considerations . . . to give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter.”28 These secondary
considerations might include “commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, [or] failure of others.”29 Secondary considerations may also be called
“indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness.”30
Secondary considerations can simplify the complex technical material often
present in patent cases.31 They also attempt to guard against courts
impermissibly relying on hindsight bias.32 The Court noted that the test for
nonobviousness would still be difficult to apply, even under this framework,
since opinions as to obviousness will surely differ in any factual scenario.33
But because the judiciary routinely faces complicated inquiries in other fields
of law, it should be able to apply the same skills in the context of
nonobviousness.34
The Supreme Court soon revisited the nonobviousness requirement to
clarify that simply combining elements previously known in the art does not
make an invention nonobvious.35 In Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement
Salvage Co., the patent at issue was a new combination of known elements for
laying asphalt: a radiant heat burner, a spreading mechanism, and a shaping
device.36 The Court concluded that all elements were previously known in the
25 Id. Prior art is defined as “[k]nowledge that is publicly known, used by others, or available on the date
of invention to a person of ordinary skill in an art.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 133 (10th ed. 2014).
26 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
27 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
28 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.
29 Id. at 17. This list of secondary considerations is not exhaustive; courts have identified additional
factors as well. See KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY, PATENT LITIGATION
AND STRATEGY 717 (4th ed. 2013).
30 Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
31 See Emer Simic, The TSM Test Is Dead! Long Live the TSM Test! The Aftermath of KSR, What Was
All the Fuss About?, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 227, 231 (2009).
32 See id.
33 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 18.
34 See id. (using negligence and scienter as examples).
35 See Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); see also Sakraida v.
Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976).
36 See Anderson’s-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 58.
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art and that to combine them would have been obvious to a PHOSITA.37 This
was especially true given that the combination did not produce a new or
unexpected result.38 Perhaps most importantly, the presence of secondary
factors like commercial success and fulfillment of a long felt but unsolved
need were, “without invention,” not enough to satisfy the patentability
standards.39 Similarly, the Court held in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. that the
“patent simply arrange[d] old elements with each performing the same
function it had been known to perform, although perhaps producing a more
striking result than in previous combinations.”40 The combination did not
satisfy the nonobviousness requirement of patentability because the function of
each element remained the same.41
B. The Development of the TSM Test as a Guard Against Hindsight Bias
The three cases described in section A, above, seemed to set a relatively
high standard for patentability, but it was just that—a standard—which the
Federal Circuit came to view as an inadequate guard against the danger of
hindsight bias in nonobviousness determinations. When the Federal Circuit
was established in 1982 and given national jurisdiction over nearly all patent
matters,42 it quickly became clear that this court preferred well-defined rules to
nebulous standards. During patent examination, explained in Part II,43 patent
examiners view the claims of the application, gather a pool of references, and
utilize those references as prior art to reject the claims in the application. The
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure permits the examiner to combine prior
art references to find each limitation of the claim when determining
obviousness.44 The Federal Circuit feared the possibility of hindsight bias
affecting such combinations45 and as a result began to develop the
teaching-suggestion-motivation test for finding a patent obvious.46 The TSM

37

See id. at 60–61.
See id.
39 Id. at 61 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 153 (1950))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
40 Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 282.
41 See id.
42 See Court Jurisdiction, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/thecourt/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
43 See infra Part II.
44 See MPEP § 2143 (9th ed., Mar. 2014).
45 See Thomas, supra note 7, at 2076 n.29.
46 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006); In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Dembiczak, 175
38

BOLT GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

3/19/2015 9:47 AM

COMBATING HINDSIGHT RECONSTRUCTION

1145

test required an examiner to show that, at the time of invention, there existed
some teaching, suggestion, or motivation that would prompt the PHOSITA to
combine the elements of the prior art to yield the claimed invention.47 The
teaching, suggestion, or motivation could come from the prior art, the
PHOSITA’s knowledge, or the nature of the problem.48 The Federal Circuit
maintained that “the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a
hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application” of the TSM
test.49
In 1992, the Federal Circuit expressed an early formulation of the TSM test
in In re Oetiker.50 In this case, the inventor claimed a metal hose clamp that
featured a “preassembly hook.”51 The examiner rejected the inventor’s claims
as obvious in view of earlier metal hose clamps combined with art from the
garment industry that utilized hook-and-eye fasteners.52 The court concluded
that the invention was not obvious because a PHOSITA in metal hose clamps
would not “reasonably be expected or motivated” to consult the teachings of
the garment industry.53 The court also noted that “it is necessary to
consider . . . common sense [when] deciding in which fields a [PHOSITA]
would reasonably be expected to look for a solution to the problem facing the
inventor.”54 The court went on to express one of the earlier formulations of the
TSM test by requiring “some reason, suggestion, or motivation found in the
prior art whereby a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention would
make the combination.”55
The Federal Circuit revisited the issue in In re Kemps, a case about “a
method of removing old asphalt concrete containing a stone fraction.”56 The
examiner rejected the claimed invention as obvious in view of two United
States patents that each disclosed one or more elements of the claim at issue.57
F.3d 994, 998–99 (Fed. Cir. 1999); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
47 See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d at 987–88.
48 See id.; Simic, supra note 31, at 231–32.
49 In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999.
50 977 F.2d 1443.
51 Id. at 1446 (internal quotation marks omitted).
52 See id.
53 Id. at 1447.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 97 F.3d 1427, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
57 See id. at 1429 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,226,552 (filed May 17, 1978) and U.S. Patent No. 4,793,730
(filed Aug. 13, 1984)).
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The motivation to combine prior art references in this case could be found in
the prior art itself. One patent taught the “heating of asphalt concrete with a
hood heated by gas burners, the breaking up of the heated asphalt with a
scarifying element, and the scraping away of the heated asphalt with a
blade.”58 A second patent taught “a similar process in which steam [was] used
to heat the asphalt surface.”59 The second patent specifically noted the
disadvantages associated with the gas burning process and taught the use of
steam to overcome those complications.60 Therefore, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) properly rejected the new application as obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.61
The Federal Circuit applied the TSM test even more strictly in In re
Dembiczak.62 The inventors had designed a large trash bag made from orange
plastic and printed with a design that made it resemble a jack-o’-lantern when
full.63 The court focused its decision in this case on hindsight, emphasizing that
determining whether an invention is obvious “requires the oft-difficult but
critical step of casting the mind back to the time of invention, to consider the
thinking of [a PHOSITA], guided only by the prior art references and the
then-accepted wisdom in the field.”64 In cases such as this, where the invention
was less complex and was developed with relative ease, examiners and courts
must be even more careful not to “fall victim to the insidious effect of a
hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the inventor taught is used against
its teacher.”65 Though the suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine
usually comes from the prior art references, it may also come from the
knowledge of the PHOSITA or the type of problem being solved.66 Wherever
the evidence originates, though, it must clearly and particularly show the
teaching, suggestion, or motivation.67 In other words, “[b]road conclusory
statements regarding the teaching of multiple references” are not enough to

58

Id.; see ’552 Patent.
In re Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1429; see ’730 Patent.
60 See In re Kemps, 97 F.3d at 1429–30.
61 See id. For another example in which the Federal Circuit found explicit TSM to combine references,
see In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
62 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
63 See id. at 996.
64 Id. at 999.
65 Id. (quoting W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
66 See id.
67 See id.
59
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prove obviousness.68 In this case, the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (Board) combined children’s art references with conventional
trash bag references but did not specifically identify any TSM to combine
those references.69 The Board instead limited its discussion to ways that the
prior art could be combined to read on each and every limitation of the claimed
invention,70 which was not enough to sustain its conclusion of obviousness.71
The Federal Circuit required the Board to explicitly state a finding of TSM,
which the Board failed to do.72
Throughout this line of cases, the Federal Circuit arguably “lowered the bar
for nonobviousness, resulting in the issuance of many patents that should [have
been] invalid.”73 By moving toward requiring an express statement of a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine in the prior art itself, the court
lowered the standard for nonobviousness: if a combination were obvious, the
prior art probably would not feel the need to expressly articulate the
suggestion.74 For twenty-five years, the Supreme Court “refused all invitations
to reexamine the Federal Circuit’s doctrinal developments” concerning the
nonobviousness requirement, so the TSM test persisted.75 During that time,
though, the TSM test and patentability standards in general were not without
their critics. Newspapers, scientific journals, and legal scholars took notice of
the patents being upheld for trivial inventions.76

68

Id.
See id. at 1000.
70 If the prior art “reads on” every limitation of the claimed invention, then every element of the claimed
invention is present in the prior art; here, the court found every element of the claimed invention somewhere in
the prior art, though not all in a single reference. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1454 (defining
“read on” as “to contain all the same features of (a prior-art reference)”).
71 See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 1000.
72 See id.
73 Timothy R. Holbrook, Obviousness in Patent Law and the Motivation to Combine: A PresumptionBased Approach, WASH. U. L. REV., Slip Opinions, Mar. 21, 2007, at 4 & n.11 available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=976695 (citing questionable patents for a crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich,
U.S. Patent No 6,004,596 (filed Dec. 8, 1997), and a method of swinging on a swing, U.S. Patent No.
6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000)).
74 See id.
75 Lunney & Johnson, supra note 12, at 65.
76 See Lori Andrews et al., When Patents Threaten Science, 314 SCIENCE 1395, 1395–96 (2006) (citing
Lori Andrews, The Patent Office as Thought Police, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 17, 2006, at B20; Editorial,
Patently Absurd, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2006, at A14, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB114117826666886050; Editorial, Patently Ridiculous, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/opinion/22wed1.html; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Biotech Patents: Looking
Backward While Moving Forward, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 317 (2006)).
69
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C. The Supreme Court Intervenes with KSR
This evolution ultimately culminated in the Federal Circuit applying a
particularly stringent version of the TSM test in Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR
International Co., in which the court required some TSM “that would have led
a [PHOSITA] to combine the relevant prior art teachings in the manner
claimed.”77 Teleflex brought suit against KSR alleging infringement of its
patent covering a vehicle pedal that could be adjusted via an electronic control.
KSR countered by asserting that the patent was invalid because its claims were
obvious.78 In granting summary judgment in favor of KSR, the district court
determined that, because the limitations of the claim at issue could be found in
a combination of prior art references, the claim was obvious.79 On appeal, the
Federal Circuit issued a non-precedential opinion that stated the established
standards for obviousness with particular reference to Section 103, Graham v.
John Deere, and In re Dembiczak.80 The court reiterated that the legal question
of obviousness is grounded in 35 U.S.C. § 103 and should be analyzed based
on the underlying factual inquiries addressed by the Graham factors.81 After
articulating the version of the TSM test noted above, the Federal Circuit
conceded that evidence of obviousness may be rebutted by the fourth Graham
factor of secondary considerations.82
The Federal Circuit’s opinion made clear its skepticism when examiners or
accused infringers combine references to reject or invalidate a patent claim as
obvious: the court feared that the hindsight bias would affect the decisions of
those viewing the patent at a later time.83 The Federal Circuit criticized the
district court’s application of the TSM test as incomplete because it did not
“make specific findings as to a suggestion or motivation to attach an electronic
control to the support bracket of the [prior art pedal] assembly.”84 This type of
specific finding would counteract the possibility of hindsight weighing too
heavily in the court’s decision.85 The court found that the award of summary
77

119 F. App’x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
See Thomas C. Goldstein, The KSR Backstory, LANDSLIDE, Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 23, 23.
79 Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 284.
80 Id. at 285 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)); see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S.
1, 14 (1966); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Goldstein, supra note 78, at 23.
81 Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 285.
82 Id.; see Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18.
83 See Teleflex, 119 F. App’x at 285–86 (citing Federal Circuit case law in favor of the TSM test and
asserting that there must be TSM to “combine the prior art teachings in the particular manner claimed” in order
to guard against the hindsight bias).
84 Id. at 288.
85 See id.
78
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judgment by the trial court was inappropriate because there were genuine
issues of material fact regarding obviousness; therefore, the Federal Circuit
vacated the decision of the district court and remanded the case for further
proceedings.86
After the Federal Circuit’s decision, KSR petitioned for a writ of certiorari.
The petition struck a chord with the Supreme Court, arguably because it
advanced the position that, because the Federal Circuit was “too pro-patent,” it
was flouting one of the primary objectives of patent law: advancing
innovation.87 By arguing that the Federal Circuit had “boldly repudiated”
Supreme Court jurisprudence, KSR persuaded the Court to take the case.88
In its opinion, the Supreme Court dismissed the Federal Circuit’s
application of the TSM test as too strict and instead relied upon its own earlier
jurisprudence to hold that a more flexible approach was required.89 To some
extent, the Court shared the Federal Circuit’s hesitancy to grant patents for
combinations of prior art, but the Court held that the framework established by
its precedent and 35 U.S.C. § 103 were sufficient to guard against the issuance
of patents on combinations of existing technology when those combinations
“yield predictable results.”90 The Court noted that it will often be necessary for
a court to consider the teachings of multiple patents; in such cases, “[t]o
facilitate review, the analysis should be made explicit.”91 The Court conceded
that the TSM test could be a helpful insight into whether a PHOSITA would
have had a reason to combine the elements of the prior art in the same way as
the claimed invention, but as a “rigid and mandatory formula,” it did not
comport with Supreme Court precedent.92

86

Id. at 290.
See Goldstein, supra note 78, at 24 (“[KSR’s counsel] fundamentally redefined the issue in the case,
and did so in a way that tapped into a much broader and deeper vein of criticism of patent jurisprudence: that
the Federal Circuit is too pro-patent and is, as a consequence, stifling innovation.”).
88 Id. (quoting Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
(No. 04-1350), 2005 WL 835463). KSR had others on its side: amici curiae including technology companies,
the Progress & Freedom Foundation, and academics; and the solicitor general, who requested the views of the
PTO. See id.
89 KSR, 550 U.S. at 415.
90 See id. at 415–17.
91 Id. at 418 (discussing the proposition that “rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by
mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness” (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed.
Cir. 2006) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
92 Id. at 418–19.
87
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The primary flaw that the Supreme Court found with the TSM test was the
Federal Circuit’s “narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry reflected in its
application of the . . . test.”93 The Court found error with the Federal Circuit’s
degree of concern with hindsight bias.94 The opinion introduced “common
sense” as a path to proving obviousness since “[c]ommon sense teaches . . .
that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes” and
a PHOSITA may “be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like
pieces of a puzzle.”95 Further, the Court emphasized that a PHOSITA might
reasonably consider prior art originally designed to solve problems other than
his or her own since the PHOSITA is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.”96 The PHOSITA would also recognize that a technique used to
improve one device could be used to improve other similar devices, so the use
of that technique may be considered obvious.97
The Court also disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the
“obvious to try” standard and held that “[w]hen there is a design need or
market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions” then “the fact that the combination was obvious to try
might show that it was obvious under § 103.”98 The Court further noted that
“simple substitution of one known element for another” is obvious, but
activities beyond simple substitution may require a more in-depth analysis to
determine obviousness.99 When all of these principles were applied to the facts
at issue, the Supreme Court held that the claim was obvious.100
II. PROSECUTION DIFFICULTIES FOLLOWING KSR
This Part explains how obviousness determinations are made at the PTO
and the changes that occurred in the MPEP following the Supreme Court’s
decision in KSR. It then examines one of the currently available methods for
combating obviousness rejections: the secondary considerations of Graham.
Finally, this Part concludes by suggesting that the secondary considerations of

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 419.
See id. at 420–21.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 421.
See id. at 417.
Id. at 421 (citation omitted).
Id. at 417.
Id. at 422.
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Graham are an inadequate guard against hindsight bias, specifically in the
context of patent prosecution.
A. Patent Examination Process
Before delving into the problems experienced in patent prosecution
following KSR, it is important to understand a patent examiner’s qualifications
and the process by which she examines patent applications. Examiners are not
required to have legal training, but they must have obtained at least a
bachelor’s degree in their respective field.101 When an application for patent is
received at the PTO, it is assigned to a single patent examiner who will read
the claims included in the application.102 Due to time constraints and
examination quotas, the examiner may not thoroughly read the specification
included in the application,103 especially if she believes she has grasped the
technology by reading only the claims.
At this point, the examiner will gather a primary group of references that
she deems relevant to the technology at hand.104 Key word searching may
bring in references that use similar or the same wording that appears in the
claims but may be directed to a different subject matter. Pressure to reject
claims upon first examination is high, especially for new examiners whose
supervisors are weary of the suggestion that as-filed claims are allowable.105 In
this context, even if the prior art appears to lack the disclosure of certain
features of the claims, the examiner may be relegated to reading the claims
broadly enough so that that the primary group of references reads on the
claims. Assuming she does not find an anticipatory reference,106 the examiner
101 See Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/exam.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2015); Patent Examiner (Computer Engineering), USAJOBS.GOV,
https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/ViewDetails/355133000 (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
102 The “patent claim” defines the scope of the patent’s protection. The claims are typically found at the
end of the patent document in a numbered list that describes the “novel features of [the] invention.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1303–04.
103 The patent “specification” (or patent application) is a considerably longer part of the patent document
that describes “how [the] invention is made and used.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1616.
The specification technically includes the inventor’s claims, see id., but this Comment adopts the convention
within the practice of patent law by referring to the claims and the specification separately.
104 See MPEP, supra note 44, § 700.
105 It is a common thought among patent attorneys that any claim not initially rejected was probably
drafted too narrowly. It is not uncommon for over 75% of applications that eventually issue as patents to be
initially rejected. See Dennis Crouch, Percentage of Patents that were Initially Rejected, PATENTLYO (Apr. 3,
2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/04/percentage-of-patents-that-were-initially-rejected.html.
106 An anticipatory reference would include every element of the claim at hand, so the claim would no
longer meet the novelty requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102.
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will be required to undertake the secondary exercise of finding ways that the
pool of primary references could be combined to teach every element of the
claims. The examiner should pause at this point in the process to consider
whether her chosen references make sense when put together; she should also
consider whether combining those references is something a PHOSITA would
have reasonably considered. In the rejection she issues, the examiner should
explain her reasoning as to why the particular references combine to read on
the applicant’s claims, as required by KSR.107
Often, though, this process does not happen as it should. Examiners may be
faced with supervisory pressure, time constraints, or inadequate appreciation of
the legal issues at hand, and may make these combinations without giving due
consideration to whether the reasoning for the combination is sound.
Misguided rejections have become more common since the Supreme Court’s
decision in KSR opened the door to impermissible hindsight by removing the
pause required by the TSM test during examination.
B. Changes in the MPEP Post-KSR
In rejecting the Federal Circuit’s requirement of TSM to combine
references, the KSR decision highlighted various rationales for obviousness
rejections to patent examiners. Following KSR, some scholars and practitioners
have expressed concern that nonobvious patents are being summarily rejected
on the basis of the highlighted rationales: providing “predictable result[s],”
being “obvious to try,” and being “common sense,” among others.108 When the
PTO revised the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) in view of
the KSR decision, it added a number of “[e]xemplary rationales that may
support a conclusion of obviousness” based on the Court’s opinion.109 The
MPEP currently states:
(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to
yield predictable results;
107

See KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
See Jeffrey K. Mills, Jason A. Fitzsimmons & Kevin Rodkey, Protecting Nanotechnology Inventions:
Prosecuting in an Unpredictable World, 7 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 223, 226 (2010); Marian Underweiser,
Presumed Obvious: How KSR Redefines the Obviousness Inquiry to Help Improve the Public Record of a
Patent, 50 IDEA 247, 268–70 (2010) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 415–16, 420–21). But cf. Tom Brody,
Obviousness in Patents Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 26, 29–30 (2010) (arguing that the KSR decision has not necessarily
resulted in an increase in obvious rejections).
109 Compare MPEP, § 2143 (8th ed. Rev. 5, Aug. 2006) (lacking examples), with MPEP, § 2143 (8th ed.
Rev. 6, Sept. 2007) (providing examples).
108
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(B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain
predictable results;
(C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or
products) in the same way;
(D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or
product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results;
(E) “Obvious to try” – choosing from a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success;
(F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it
for use in either the same field or a different one based on design
incentives or other market forces if the variations are predictable to
one of ordinary skill in the art;
(G) Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that
would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference
or to combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed
invention.110

Examiners can use these rationales to combine references under KSR. In short,
“KSR increased the range of arguments available for asserting the obviousness
of an invention,”111 thus making patent applications easier to reject without a
thoughtful, well-reasoned explanation as to why the claimed invention is
obvious.112
Prior to KSR, though the Federal Circuit suggested it was permissible to
rely upon an implicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation, most of its cases
seemed to apply a rigid rule that required an explicit teaching, suggestion, or
motivation within the references themselves.113 This supplied patent applicants
with a standby strategy to combat obviousness rejections: if applicable, assert a
lack of explicit TSM to combine in the cited references themselves. But in
light of the new exemplary rationales to support obviousness rejections, and
without the requirement for TSM to combine, patent applicants after KSR have
been left with little to combat potential hindsight bias implicated in
obviousness rejections other than the KSR requirement for explicit analysis in
the rejection114 and the secondary considerations of Graham.115

110

See MPEP, supra note 44, § 2143.
Mills, supra note 108, at 228 (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 413–419).
112 See id.
113 In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987–88 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
114 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
115 See Post-KSR Patent Prosecution “Survival Guide,” CROWELL MORING (May 16, 2007),
http://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/IP-Insights/Post-KSR-Patent-Prosecution-SurvivalGuide/pdf (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
111
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C. Development of the Secondary Considerations of Graham
Legal scholars have proposed, and courts have adopted, various secondary
considerations to consider in the fourth Graham factor. These so-called
“objective indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness” are usually
“non-technical [factors] . . . which focus the [S]ection 103 inquiry on economic
and motivational issues surrounding the development of the claimed
invention.”116 The Graham decision itself contemplated “commercial success,
[fulfillment of] long felt but unsolved needs, [or] failure of others” as potential
secondary considerations.117 Other examples include “unexpected results,”118
“licensing to potential competitors, copying by an infringer, progress of the
patent application through the [PTO], near-simultaneous invention by another
researcher in the field, and professional approval by experts in the field.”119
In the context of litigation, secondary considerations can work well as one
factor in the Graham test for obviousness because they “substantially
simplif[y] the obviousness inquiry” by their “non-technical” nature.120 Because
they “[gave] insight into the circumstances surrounding the development of the
claimed invention,” these considerations also “reduce[] the danger that the
obviousness evaluation would be based on hindsight, or that the inventor’s
discovery would inadvertently be read into the prior art.”121 Since any
litigation necessarily takes place after the patent has issued, there is a greater
likelihood that the patented technology has the potential to have been
commercially exploited, and therefore many of the secondary considerations
can be proven if they exist.122

116 Dorothy Whelan, Note, A Critique of the Use of Secondary Considerations in Applying the Section 103
Nonobviousness Test for Patentability, 28 B.C. L. REV. 357, 365 (1987) (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 and
Richard L. Robbins, Note, Subtests of “Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1171–72 (1964)).
117 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
118 Andrew Blair-Stanek, Increased Market Power as a New Secondary Consideration in Patent Law, 58
AM. U. L. REV. 707, 712–13 (2009) (listing nine secondary considerations developed by courts).
119 Whelan, supra note 116, at 366.
120 Id. (citing Graham, 383 U.S. at 36 and Robbins, supra note 116).
121 Id. at 367.
122 See generally Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc., 699 F.3d
1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding secondary considerations sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of
obviousness).
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D. Inadequacy or Impracticality of Secondary Considerations in Patent
Prosecution
Although secondary considerations may be an adequate guard against
hindsight in litigation, they are often less helpful in the context of patent
prosecution for several reasons. First, objective indicia of nonobviousness such
as commercial success or commercial acquiescence via licensing may not be
available at the prosecution stage since applicants may wait until the patent is
granted to commercialize or seek licensees. Second, evidence of copying by
competitors is not applicable in prosecution, particularly if the application has
not yet published; presumably, competitors have nothing to copy since the
technology may have been kept secret prior to patenting. Third, progress of the
patent application through the PTO cannot be considered during the
application process. The other secondary considerations, though perhaps more
applicable than their counterparts at the prosecution stage, still may not be
available without the benefit of an adversary and the opportunity for discovery.
Fourth, the MPEP requires a nexus between the evidence of secondary
considerations provided and the claimed invention.123 For example, the
applicant must be able to prove that the reason for commercial success is the
claimed invention itself and not a clever marketing campaign.124 Though the
nexus requirement is admittedly necessary, it may be exceedingly difficult to
prove to the examiner.125 Finally, some attorneys report that arguing secondary
considerations in a response before the PTO “typically falls on deaf ears” since
examiners often view evidence of secondary considerations as something to be
weighed only when the obviousness inquiry is a “close call.”126
Prosecuting attorneys are often left to argue technical distinctions between
the claims and the prior art to combat rejections for obviousness. Due to the
unavailability or impracticality in prosecution of secondary considerations for
guarding against hindsight bias, a vacuum remains that invites a new test to
fairly and adequately assess whether an examiner has used impermissible
hindsight to combine references in a rejection based upon obviousness.

123

See MPEP, supra note 44, § 716.01(b).
See id.
125 See id.
126 Secondary Considerations, FISH IP LAW, http://www.fishiplaw.com/~fishipla/chapter11a.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2015).
124
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III. FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING USE OF IMPERMISSIBLE HINDSIGHT
This Part proposes a framework for determining whether an obviousness
rejection is based on an impermissible level of hindsight bias. It proposes
considering ten factors in the totality of the circumstances to gauge whether the
degree of hindsight employed by the examiner to reject claims as obvious
under Section 103 was permissible.127 The factors are principally inspired by
indicia that courts have historically considered relevant when determining
obviousness. The provided framework is intended as a check on the patent
examination process described in Part II.128 The examiner may generate a
rejection based on one of the exemplary rationales set forth in the MPEP, but
this framework gives a legal basis for argument to applicants who believe the
rejection is impermissibly based upon hindsight. A proper obviousness
rejection is based on a “fact-intensive comparison of the claimed process with
the prior art rather than the mechanical application of one or another per se
rule.”129 This Comment recognizes that every patent examination is necessarily
subject to some degree of hindsight,130 but the goal of this framework is to
determine whether an examiner has crossed the line between permissible
unavoidable hindsight and the bias of impermissible hindsight. The intent of
the proposed framework is to focus on whether the examiner was fair in the
process of considering the obviousness of the application at hand.
Each of the sections below proposes considering a factor that may indicate
whether an examiner has relied on impermissible hindsight. The factors listed
here are not an all-inclusive list, as there are likely many others that could
reasonably bear on the question of hindsight. The factors have their basis in
existing case law, and many have been considered important to the overall
question of obviousness. This Part proceeds in ten sections, which will address
each of this Comment’s proposed factors in turn: (1) the degree to which the
combined references show or suggest all elements of the claim being
examined; (2) the degree to which the rejection is based on a clearly
articulated, reasonable rationale to combine references; (3) the degree to which
the results are predictable; (4) the degree to which the combined references are
compatible; (5) the degree to which the examiner has analyzed each of the
127

See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
See supra Part II.A.
129 Austen Zuege & Carolyn Beck, No Short-Cuts: Weighing the Facts Under §103, 91 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 398, 402 (2009) (quoting In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
130 See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
128
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references as a whole rather than picking and choosing key phrases; (6) the
degree to which combining the references would change the principle of
operation of the primary reference; (7) the degree to which one or more of the
references teach away from the combination made by the applicant; (8) the
degree to which the cited references are analogous art to the application;
(9) the number of references combined for the rejection; and (10) the degree to
which the examiner cites to inapplicable case law.
A. Degree to Which References Show or Suggest All Elements of the Claim
The first factor to be considered is the degree to which the references relied
upon in the rejection actually show or suggest all elements of the claim at
issue. The case law and the MPEP require that all claim limitations be
considered when judging the obviousness of that claim.131 Examiners
sometimes fail to “explain where or how [the] cited art [teaches] or suggest[s]
all of the features of a claimed invention.”132 Given the process of patent
examination explained in Part II,133 it is easy to see how this oversight might
occur: once the pool of references has been gathered, the examiner may be
tempted to stretch the contents of the prior art in the pool to make her
rejections. However, the law still requires “an examiner [to] make ‘a searching
comparison of the claimed invention—including all its limitations—with the
teaching of the prior art.’”134
It is well established that the prior art must usually disclose every limitation
of a given claim under consideration, but perhaps this requirement is part of a
larger guard against hindsight.135 Given the examination process discussed in
Part II,136 it seems reasonable to infer that an examiner might be tempted to
131

See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1970); MPEP, supra note 44, § 2143.03.
Michael E. Kondoudis, How to Respond to § 103 Rejections Using the “All Elements Test” in View of
Recent Revisions to Section 2143.03 of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure – Part II,
PATENTABLYDEFINED (May 27, 2008), http://patentablydefined.com/2008/05/27/how-to-respond-to%C2%A7-103-obviousness-rejections-using-the-%E2%80%9Call-elements-test%E2%80%9D-in-view-ofrecent-revisions-to-section-214303-of-the-manual-of-patent-examining-procedure-part-ii/.
133 See supra Part II.A.
134 Ex parte Wada, No. 2007-3733, 2008 WL 142652, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 14, 2008) (quoting In re Ochiai,
71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (requiring
that the prior art “disclose, suggest, or render obvious the claimed invention, either individually or when
combined”).
135 Ex parte Wada, 2008 WL 142652, at *4. Admittedly, there are exceptions to this rule; in particular,
when a concept is so well-known that it need not be memorialized in prior art then it may not be necessary for
the prior art to disclose that limitation. See MPEP, supra note 44, § 2144.03.
136 See supra Part II.A.
132
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stretch the contents of the prior art to make a rejection. If the claim element
clearly defines “X,” and the references describe the similar but distinct concept
of “Y,” there is a high degree of separation between the claim element and the
references. If the examiner reads the claim element X into a reference that
clearly states Y, it stands to reason that the examiner may have used hindsight
to bridge the gap: the claimed invention is providing a roadmap that the
element would have fit into the prior art. This is an exercise in impermissible
hindsight analysis. Thus the extent to which the claim discloses certain
elements that are not shown or suggested in the references is probative of the
extent to which an examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject
the claim as obvious.
B. Degree to Which the Rationale to Combine is Reasonable
The second factor to consider is the degree to which a rejection states a
reasonable rationale to combine the references. In KSR, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the standard that the analysis made by the examiner should be
explicit and that “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning
[is required] to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.”137 Thus, if the
examiner thoroughly explains her reasoning for combining the references in a
way that could reasonably make sense to a PHOSITA, then the examiner has
met her procedural burden and may have made a proper rejection.138 However,
if the reasoning is not clearly presented in a sensible manner, or if the
reasoning is merely conclusory, this suggests the use of impermissible
hindsight in the selection and combination of the references.139 If the
combination cannot be explained, it seems likely that, in truth, the combination
was derived using the applicant’s specification as a roadmap.140 For example,
the use of the applicant’s teaching to explain the combination of prior art
references would be an obvious exercise in impermissible hindsight. The
extent to which a rejection fails to state a reasonable rationale, or any rationale
at all, to combine references may indicate the extent to which an examiner has
relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious.141

137

KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
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C. Degree to Which Results Are Predictable
The predictability of the benefits and results of the technology is probative
when determining whether an examiner has relied upon impermissible
hindsight to combine references. Predictability has long been considered142
when making obviousness determinations. An examiner might best determine
whether an inventor’s solution is considered predictable by pausing to consider
whether a PHOSITA would have had a “reasonable expectation of success” in
combining the teachings of the prior art.143 To be obvious, “absolute
predictability of success” is not required, since “[t]here is always at least a
possibility” that unexpected results could arise from the combination.144
Further, as a general rule, more complex technologies are less likely to be
predictable—patents for pharmaceutical compounds, for example, are
“notorious[ly]” unpredictable.145 In these types of complex technological
fields, there are many parameters that might be varied. When the prior art
provides little guidance as to which parameters might be most likely to
successfully create the combination, the results are likely to be unpredictable
and therefore nonobvious.146 Though “unexpected results” are often analyzed
as one of the secondary considerations contemplated by Graham,147 the
presence of unexpected results may also imply that the combinations of
references made to reject claims were generated with the use of impermissible
hindsight. Rejecting claims and combining references without a full
appreciation that the invention would not predictably flow from the
combination points toward the use of impermissible hindsight.
When an examiner combines references to form an obviousness rejection in
a technological field with little predictability, that combination may be subject
to some degree of impermissible hindsight. In unpredictable fields, a
PHOSITA would have less expectation of success when combining elements
known independently in the prior art. Stated differently, a PHOSITA would be
more likely to experience unexpected results in an unpredictable field. The
result of a simple substitution of one screw for a different type of screw is
142

See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 681, 692 (2010) (citing Life Techs., Inc. v. Clontech
Labs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
144 In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903.
145 See In re Kamal, 398 F.2d 867, 871 (C.C.P.A. 1968); see also Sean B. Seymore, Heightened
Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 137–38 (2008).
146 See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
147 See, e.g., Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 662–63 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Graham v. John
Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)).
143
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likely to be predictable and therefore obvious. However, in the context of other
fields, the inventor may not have a similar expectation of success. It might
even seem obvious in hindsight that a given combination or substitution could
successfully be made, but it is likely the case that, at the time of filing,
conventional wisdom could not have predicted that success. The extent to
which the results or benefits of an invention are unpredictable is probative of
the extent to which an examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to
reject the claim as obvious.
D. Degree of Compatibility Among Cited References
Another factor to consider is the degree to which the references cited in the
rejection are compatible with each other. The compatibility of the references
has long been considered important to the overall question of obviousness148
but also bears specifically on whether a rejection of claims for obviousness in a
patent application is the product of impermissible hindsight. For example, in In
re Whiton, a case concerning polymers used in “extruded and molded plastic
articles,” the inventor “plasticiz[ed]” the polymer with a specific type of
polyester to make it more flexible than its previously rigid state.149 The
examiner rejected the inventor’s claims based on several prior art references.150
Two references disclosed a polymer similar to the one claimed that could be
mixed with ingredients such as plasticizers to achieve flexibility.151 However,
these references did not mention “any specific plasticizers suitable for use”
with the polymers, so the examiner consulted other references for their
disclosure of the inventor’s type of polyester used with a different type of
polymer.152 The court concluded that no evidence existed to suggest that a
PHOSITA would recognize that the polyester plasticizer used with one type of
polymer would be compatible with the other type of polymer.153 Because there
was no evidence that the teachings of the references were compatible, the
rejection based on those references was overturned and the invention was held
to be nonobvious.154

148 See generally In re Whiton, 420 F.2d 1082 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (addressing the issue of obviousness in
light of the compatibility of references particular to the patent in question).
149 Id. at 1082–83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 See id. at 1083.
151 See id.
152 See id. at 1084.
153 See id. at 1085.
154 See id. at 1085–86.
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In cases like this one, it seems likely that the examiner focused upon
finding claim elements in the prior art and lost sight of what a PHOSITA
would have considered during the inventive process. In essence, such an
examiner might have focused on finding elements of claims in references
without pausing to consider how a PHOSITA would perceive the
incompatibility of the references. If a PHOSITA viewed the teachings of the
prior art as incompatible, she would be unlikely to combine them. The
examiner, however, has the benefit of the claims to assist in finding each
element of the invention, regardless of the compatibility of the references.
Thus the extent to which a rejection relies upon references that are
incompatible with each other is probative of the extent to which an examiner
has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious.
E. Degree of Analysis of the Reference as a Whole
Another factor to consider is the degree to which the examiner has analyzed
each reference as a whole; this analysis should also consider whether the
examiner has considered the claimed invention as a whole. Case law has long
stated, “The relevant portions of a reference include not only those teachings
which would suggest particular aspects of an invention to one having ordinary
skill in the art, but also those teachings which would lead such a person away
from the claimed invention.”155 This statement implies that the reference
should be considered in its entirety in the determination of obviousness, not
just the portions that seem to support the idea of the combination the examiner
wants to make. An examiner’s reliance on “isolated teachings of the prior art
without considering the over-all context within which those teachings are
presented” is improper and should be considered when determining the use of
impermissible hindsight.156 The obviousness inquiry should not be focused on
the “obviousness of substitutions and differences” but rather on the
obviousness of the “invention as a whole.”157
Choosing bits and pieces of the prior art that favor the combination the
examiner wants to make, and failing to consider each reference as a whole,
may indicate that the examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to
make that combination. When researching a particular field of invention to
inspire the next steps in the inventive process, the applicant would be faced
155

In re Mercier, 515 F.2d 1161, 1166 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
Id.
157 Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing Hodosh v.
Block Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
156
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with the references as a whole instead of with key words or phrases that match
the wording of her invention. Without the benefit of her not-yet-written claims
guiding the search process, the applicant would not know which portions of the
reference she should consider relevant and which portions might be overlooked
during examination.158 The examiner has the benefit of the claims before her.
To use the claims to piece together information that a PHOSITA would not
have combined when faced with the references as a whole is an exercise in
impermissible hindsight reconstruction. Thus, the extent to which an examiner
chooses bits and pieces of the prior art, and in doing so fails to consider the
references as a whole, is probative of the extent to which an examiner has
relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious.
F. Degree to Which Combination Changes the Principle of Operation
Another factor that should be considered is the degree to which the
proposed modification or combination of the prior art would change the
principle of the operation of the prior art. Such a concept has long been
considered relevant to patentability. For example, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals found in In re Ratti that a particular combination of references
did not constitute proper grounds for an obviousness rejection since the
combination “would require a substantial reconstruction and redesign” of the
prior art as well as a change in its principles of operation.159 Though the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences viewed Ratti as “non-controlling in law”
following KSR, it also implied that a change in the principle of operation may
be persuasive in fact, even if not in law.160
A combination of references that would render a prior art technology
unsatisfactory for its intended purpose seems to persuasively point toward the
use of hindsight, even if such a finding is not controlling in law. When an
examiner combines references without giving due consideration to whether the
proposed combination would change the principle of operation of the primary
reference, the building of the combination is more likely to be an exercise in
impermissible hindsight. Again, the presence of key terms within multiple
references may have supplanted real thought and reasoning as to why the
158

In re Mercier, 515 F.2d at 1166.
See In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 813 (C.C.P.A. 1959). Of course, if the prior art would still operate
according to the same principles, even once combined with elements of other references, then Ratti is
inapplicable. In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Umbarger, 407 F.2d 425, 430–
31 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
160 See Ex parte Purcell & Benedict, No. 2008-004765, 2009 WL 1717401, at *5 (B.P.A.I. June 3, 2009).
159
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combination would have reasonably been made by a PHOSITA. In this respect,
the examiner may have ignored or may not have been cognizant of the fact that
her combination required a change in the prior art that rendered it unsuitable
for its intended purpose. The extent to which an examiner’s rejection relies
upon a combination of references that would change the principle of operation
of the prior art may indicate the extent to which an examiner has relied upon
impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious.
G. Degree to Which References Teach Away from the Applicant’s
Combination
Another factor that should be considered is the degree to which the
references cited in the obviousness rejection actually discourage the
combination made in the claimed invention. To establish a prima facie case of
obviousness, the examiner must offer some “articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning” to combine the teachings of prior art references.161 This
combination may not be rationally made if one of the prior art references
“teaches away from its combination with another source.”162 A reference
teaches away from the combination if
a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be
discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or
would be led in a direction divergent from the path that was taken by
the applicant . . . [or] if it suggests that the line of development
flowing from the reference’s disclosure is unlikely to be productive
of the result sought by the applicant.163

The Federal Circuit has also held that if the combination of two references
“‘would produce a seemingly inoperative device,’ then they teach away from
their combination.”164
By way of example, the Federal Circuit found this notion of teaching away
in a case involving a “blood filter assembly” to remove clots and other items
from a patient’s blood before it was returned to the patient’s body.165 The prior
art cited against the claimed invention was a “liquid strainer for removing dirt
161

In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418

(2007).
162

Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Mfg. Mich. Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
See id. at 1360 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
164 Id. (quoting In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 587 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
165 See In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 900–02 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163
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and water from gasoline.”166 The primary difference between the claimed
invention and the prior art was the position of the inlet and outlet openings at
the top or bottom of the device.167 The court found that if the prior art strainer
was “turned upside down” to look like the claimed invention, as suggested by
the PTO Board of Appeals, “it would be rendered inoperable for its intended
purpose.”168 This inoperability led the Federal Circuit to conclude that the prior
art taught away from the Board’s proposed modification.169 This idea of
teaching away was also found when the relevant references regarding “[t]ape
of unsintered polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE)[,] (known by the trademark
TEFLON of E.I. du Pont de Nemours, Inc.),”170 suggested that, to avoid
breakage, Teflon should be slowly stretched to the desired length.171 The
inventor disregarded this conventional wisdom by stretching the Teflon as
quickly as possible and found that this technique allowed him to stretch it to
lengths he was previously unable to achieve.172 Because the prior art taught
away from the method undertaken by the inventor, the inventor’s method was
not obvious.173
If the cited references would discourage a PHOSITA from making the
combination of references to arrive at the invention claimed in the patent, but
the examiner relies upon them for an obviousness rejection, that rejection
implicates some degree of impermissible hindsight. It seems likely that the
examiner ignored the full teaching of the reference, did not understand the full
teaching of the reference, or did not read the reference at all. Only in hindsight
would it be obvious to make a combination that the conventional wisdom
warns against making or suggests is likely to be unsuccessful. The extent to
which an examiner relies on references that teach away from the combination
of the claimed invention may indicate the extent to which the examiner has
relied upon impermissible hindsight to choose or combine the reference or
references. The same is true when the rejection relies upon a combination of
references that would render the prior art inoperable for its intended purpose,

166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

See id. at 901.
See id. at 901–02.
Id. at 902.
See id.
W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
See id. at 1545.
See id.
See id. at 1552–53.
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like the blood filter assembly above, and therefore implicitly teaches away
from the combination.174
H. Degree to Which References Are Analogous to the Application
Another factor that should be considered is the degree to which the
references cited in the rejection are analogous to the art in the application. The
concept of analogous art developed as courts and examiners attempted to
define what a PHOSITA would have reasonably consulted in seeking a
solution to the problem addressed by his or her invention. Not surprisingly
then, “References . . . qualify as prior art for an obviousness determination
only when analogous to the claimed invention.”175 A reference is considered
analogous art if “(1) . . . the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless
of the problem addressed, and (2) if the reference is not within the field of the
inventor’s endeavor, . . . [it] is still reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the inventor is involved.”176 The analogous art test
presumes that the inventor has full knowledge of all of the prior art in her field
of endeavor and also “presume[s] knowledge [of] those arts reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem” that the inventor was trying to solve.177
The test recognizes, however, that it would be impossible for an inventor to be
aware of “every teaching in every art,” so it attempts to “approximate the
reality of the circumstances surrounding the making of an invention.”178
Under the first prong of the test for analogous art, the examiner must
“determine the appropriate field of endeavor by reference to explanations of
the invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the
embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.”179 Courts have
previously confined the field of endeavor to the scope articulated in the
background section of the patent application180 and have also allowed the use

174
175

See In re Gordon, 733 F.2d at 900–02.
In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir.

1992)).
176

Id. (citing In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (citing In re Antle, 444 F.2d 1168, 1171–72
(C.C.P.A. 1971)).
178 Id.
179 In re Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325.
180 See id. at 1325–26.
177
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of references “hav[ing] essentially the same function and structure” as the
invention.181
Under the second prong of the analogous test, “[a] reference is reasonably
pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the
inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals,
logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in
considering [her] problem.”182 This second prong was reinforced in KSR when
the Court noted that “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their
primary purposes.”183 By way of example, the Federal Circuit has found that
an inventor considering a “hinge and latch mechanism for portable computers”
could reasonably be expected to consider other types of hinges and latches
such as “a desktop telephone directory, a piano lid, a kitchen cabinet, a
washing machine cabinet, a wooden furniture cabinet, [and] a two-part housing
for storing audio cassettes” even though these examples did not squarely fit
within the inventor’s field of endeavor.184
The analogous art test exists as a basis to argue that prior art does not
apply, but if non-analogous art is cited by examiners, that citation may bear
specifically on whether the examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight
to choose or combine the reference or references. If an examiner manages to
cite non-analogous prior art, she did so without giving due consideration to
whether the reference falls within the same field of endeavor as the invention
or whether it is reasonably pertinent to the problem the inventor faced. For
example, a citation to non-analogous art may occur because an examiner has
performed a keyword search of the prior art and found a phrase within the
reference that seems similar enough to the claimed invention. This method of
choosing a piece of prior art, or choosing to combine more than one piece of
prior art, does not give due consideration to whether a PHOSITA would have
reasonably consulted that particular reference and applied its teaching in
seeking a solution to the problem addressed by his or her invention. It follows
that impermissible hindsight is the primary vehicle utilized to conclude that it
would have been obvious to a PHOSITA to include the limitation presented by

181 Id. at 1326 (quoting In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
182 In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Clay, 966
F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
183 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007).
184 In re Icon, 496 F.3d at 1380 (quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481–82 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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the non-analogous reference in the claimed invention based on the similarity of
terminology. Thus considering the extent to which an examiner cites
non-analogous art may, as part of the framework as a whole, indicate the extent
to which an examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the
claim as obvious.
I. Number of References Combined
The number of references combined to make an obviousness rejection may
indicate whether the examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight and
should be considered as one factor in this proposed test. It is clear that the
examiner may permissibly combine references for a rejection based on
obviousness as long as she complies with other standards set forth in the MPEP
and 35 U.S.C. § 103.185 No rule exists that explicitly states the maximum
number of references she may permissibly combine.186 In fact, courts have held
that the number of references combined to form a rejection is not a dispositive
factor in determining obviousness.187 In one case, a combination of about
twenty references was not enough to show obviousness when the references
“‘skirt[ed] all around’ the claimed invention.”188 In another, the Federal Circuit
clearly stated that the deciding principle of obviousness “is not the number of
references, but what they would have meant to a person of ordinary skill in the
field of the invention.”189
Though it seems clear that the number of references combined to form a
rejection is not a dispositive indicator of nonobviousness,190 it should be
considered as one factor in a flexible framework to determine the use of
impermissible hindsight by the examiner. It makes sense that a greater number
of references combined would suggest a higher degree of hindsight bias
because it suggests that the examiner is stretching to find all of the elements of
the claimed invention. The probability increases that the references are
included as showing or suggesting particular elements of the claimed invention
without due consideration for whether a PHOSITA would combine those
185

See generally MPEP, supra note 44, § 2141 (treating combinations as common practice).
See MPEP, supra note 44, § 2145.
187 See id. at § 2145(V); see, e.g., In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hybritech, Inc. v.
Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Kan. Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144,
1149 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Troiel, 274 F.2d 944, 947 (C.C.P.A. 1960); In re Streckert, 167 F.2d 1010, 1011
(C.C.P.A. 1948); In re Miller, 159 F.2d 756, 758–59 (C.C.P.A. 1947).
188 In re Gorman, 933 F.2d at 986 (alteration in original) (quoting Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1383).
189 Id.
190 See id.
186
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references. As described in Part II,191 if the examiner cannot make a
combination of references with relative ease that contains every element of the
invention and would seem reasonable to a PHOSITA, then she is faced with
either allowing the claim or, more likely, finding another way to reject it. At
this point, the examiner will probably look to the application’s claims to find
which elements are missing from her established pool of references and will
begin to search again for those elements. While it is possible that she will find
a legitimate reference in this second round of searching, it is also possible that
she is using the claim as a template to pick and choose pieces of many different
references, which is an exercise in hindsight. When the examiner must
combine many different references in order to substantiate the rejection, it
becomes less likely that a PHOSITA would have reasonably looked to that
number of sources to solve the problem she faced. This suggests the use of an
impermissible degree of hindsight. The extent to which an examiner cites to a
greater number of references is probative of the extent to which the examiner
has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject the claim as obvious.
J. Degree to Which Rejection Cites Inapplicable Case Law
The final factor that should be considered is the degree to which a rejection
for obviousness cites to case law and, if so, the degree to which that case law is
applicable to the facts at issue and applied appropriately. Though the
examiner’s task is often extremely difficult, this oversight occurs more often
than it should, probably due in part to the lack of legal training the examiners
have received.192 Section 2144.04 of the MPEP provides patent examiners with
cases meant to serve as guidance to navigate common arguments made for and
against obviousness during patent prosecution.193 These cases are included as
examples to be considered in light of their facts and limitations.194 Problems
arise, though, when “examiners sometimes apply [the MPEP examples]
without having read the actual cases and therefore without a full understanding
of the context and limitations of the legal holdings announced in those
cases.”195 Some authors have compared the process to the popular children’s
game of “telephone,” in which a message becomes distorted while being
passed through several intermediary sources between the originator and the

191
192
193
194
195

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See Zuege & Beck, supra note 129, at 402; see also MPEP, supra note 44, § 2144.04.
See Zuege & Beck, supra note 129, at 402.
Id.
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final recipient.196 “By the time the cases from [the] MPEP . . . are cited against
claims in patent applications, they are sometimes applied as sweeping per se
pronouncements that find no support in the underlying cases and threaten to
render all inventions unpatentable.”197 The temptation to rely upon the MPEP
without fully considering the reach of the cases it cites is understandable,
especially given the examiner’s “difficult task in having to understand and
analyze a broad range of technologies based only on the text of patent
applications before them, which are not always easy to read or put in
context.”198 The standard remains, though, that the examiner must apply the
law to the facts of the particular application before the PTO.199 Per se rules
which eliminate “the need for fact-specific analysis of claims and prior art may
be administratively convenient for [US]PTO examiners and the Board [of
Patent Appeals & Interferences]. Indeed, they have been sanctioned by the
Board as well. But reliance on per se rules of obviousness is legally incorrect
and must cease.”200
The extent to which an examiner relies on sweeping pronouncements from
inapplicable case law may indicate the extent to which the examiner has relied
upon impermissible hindsight to make the obviousness rejection. If an
examiner relies upon a case, most likely one found in the MPEP, to reject a
claim without properly examining the facts of the case in comparison with the
application at issue, the examiner has not satisfied the procedural requirements
of patent examination. The temptation to cite inapplicable case law might be
especially great when, in light of the application before the PTO, the invention
seems obvious to the examiner; in that case, citing to a case blurb included in
the MPEP may serve as a convenient way to fill in the gaps between the facts
of the application and what is taught by the references. This reliance may be an
exercise in hindsight, and a greater number of citations to inapplicable case law
may indicate a higher degree of hindsight. Thus, considering the degree to
which an examiner cites inapplicable law would reduce the potential of the
rejection being based on hindsight.

196
197
198
199
200

See id.
Id.
Id. at 401.
See id. at 402.
Id. at 402–03 (alterations in original) (quoting In re Ochiai, 71 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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IV. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON PATENT EXAMINATION AND APPEAL
This Part analyzes the potential impact of adopting the test described in
Part III on patent examination and appeal processes. It submits that arguing the
factors discussed above in a response to rejections from the PTO might reduce
the need for appeals and therefore reduce the financial burden on the applicant.
This Part also considers the burden that would be placed on examiners, their
supervisors, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) if the test were
adopted and attempts to dispel any concerns with that burden.
When the process of patent prosecution is conducted fairly and adequately
by the PTO and the examiner, the proposed framework will bear this out.
When the examiner pauses to consider whether a combination of references
would reasonably be considered by a PHOSITA and concludes that it would,
the examiner has fulfilled her procedural duty under the proposed framework,
even if the substance of her decision may be debated by the prosecuting
attorney. To the extent that a rejection is based on impermissible hindsight, the
factors considered should reveal this to be true. When a rejection is sound, the
factors considered should bear this out as well. The task of arguing to the
examiner that she has relied upon impermissible hindsight when examining the
case at hand is a delicate one, but it may be a more attainable task for
applicants who cannot yet produce evidence of the secondary considerations of
Graham.
Adopting this test could also reduce the financial burden of patent
prosecution. In the current process, if an examiner refuses to allow claims that
the prosecuting attorney maintains are nonobvious, the best recourse available
is to file an appeal. The appeal process can be expensive when considering the
appeal fees imposed by the PTO as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees,
especially when compared to the cost of filing an application, and may be
overly burdensome for small entity inventors.201 The recently passed America
Invents Act reduced all patent-prosecution- and appeal-related fees for small
and micro entities,202 which suggests congressional policy concern about the
cost to small businesses of obtaining and maintaining a patent portfolio.
Because adopting this test could reduce the need for appeals, it could similarly
reduce the financial burden on entities small and large when faced with
rejections on arguably nonobvious subject matter.
201 See Fee Schedule—Patent Trial and Appeal Fees, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee010114.htm#appeal (last revised Mar. 1, 2015).
202 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10(b), 125 Stat. 284, 316–18 (2011).
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Some would argue that considering ten factors as part of a larger test
unduly burdens the examiner or anyone reviewing the examiner’s work,
including a supervisor or the PTAB. This Comment submits that the
framework proposed here is an even-handed one: the burden is placed on both
the examiner and the prosecuting attorney. The examiner will need to be more
deliberate and thoughtful in making rejections, and the prosecuting attorney
will have an avenue through which to assess whether those rejections are based
upon impermissible hindsight. Moreover, multifactor tests are currently used in
other areas of patent law: the eight Wands factors for enablement,203 the
thirteen factors for experimental use,204 and of course the four Graham factors
already discussed in this Comment at length.205 In addition, other legal fields
commonly employ multifactor tests. One closely related example is the test for
likelihood of confusion in trademark law, which most jurisdictions apply as an
eight- or nine-factor test.206
The particular framework proposed in this Comment not only echoes the
ease of multifactor tests commonly utilized in patent law as well as other
fields, but it also embodies the flexibility that the Supreme Court emphasized
with respect to obviousness determinations in KSR. None of the factors
proposed here are dispositive, but they must be considered in the totality of the
circumstances. Applying tests similar to the one proposed here is a burden
commonly shouldered by courts and one that should be easily borne by
examiners whenever the need may arise. If the burden of applying the test is
not shouldered by examiners, patent attorneys are left with little to
counterbalance the possibility that an examiner has impermissibly relied upon
hindsight to reject the applicant’s patent claims as obvious. Requiring the
examiner to shoulder the burden of the framework described in Part III
admittedly places a large burden on examiners as well as their supervisors, but
the benefit of adopting such a framework—providing recourse to patent
applicants who may otherwise be unfairly deprived of patent claims they
deserve—outweighs the cost.

203
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CONCLUSION
The issue of obviousness has been one of the most difficult determinations
in patent law since the passage of the Patent Act of 1952. One of the foremost
concerns within the requirement of obviousness has been the fear of hindsight
bias affecting the determination. To combat that possibility, the Federal Circuit
developed the bright-line rule of the TSM test. Though the Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the standard for obviousness in KSR by rejecting the use of
the TSM test as the sole test for obviousness, many questions remain
unanswered, including how to best guard against the use of impermissible
hindsight during patent examination.
This Comment has proposed a framework for evaluating whether an
examiner has relied upon impermissible hindsight to reject a patent as obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 during the examination process. Recognizing that some
degree of hindsight is necessarily employed in patent examination, the
proposed framework utilizes a number of factors, considered in the totality of
the circumstances, that will focus the hindsight inquiry specifically on whether
the degree of hindsight relied upon by the examiner has crossed the threshold
between allowable, unavoidable hindsight and the bias of impermissible
hindsight. Most of the factors are drawn from questions that courts have
considered important to the overall determination of patentability, or in some
cases obviousness in particular, and this Comment suggests that all of these
factors bear on the question of hindsight.
The adoption of the proposed framework would provide a strategy for
patent practitioners to argue that an examiner must have relied upon
impermissible hindsight to reject a claim as obvious. In some cases, the
framework may weigh against the applicant, as is the nature of any balancing
test. However, the goal of this Comment’s proposed framework is not to
always weigh in favor of the applicant but rather to provide an avenue for
discussion among the applicant, the examiner, and if necessary the PTAB or
Federal Circuit. The burden placed upon examiners is a necessary one if the
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patent system is to properly weigh the interest of the inventor in protecting her
invention while granting patents only for significant leaps in innovation.
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